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Abstract  
Freedom of religion has been described as the paradigm freedom of conscience and 
of the essence in a free society, but the re-emergence of religion in the public sphere 
has elicited great publicity. The wearing of the female Islamic dress, commonly the 
headscarf (hijab), is a complex and multi-faceted issue that is often raised in legal 
and political debates, particularly in the education and employment areas across 
Europe. This work examines the role of the European Union in the regulation of 
Member States‟ approaches to individuals wearing the Islamic headscarf. The 
European Convention of Human Rights and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights have set a strict and clear precedent: a State can limit the individual‟s 
right to manifest their religious belief in a number of circumstances with the margin of 
appreciation afforded to them. Most judgments from the Court have found in favour of 
the state, and this work will attempt to understand the reasoning behind these 
decisions, and offer critiques if necessary. 
 
Keywords: Religion, Freedom of Expression, Headscarf, European Union, 
Human Rights, Education, Discrimination. 
Introduction 
The Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is probably the 
most precious of all human rights, and the imperative need today is to 
make it a reality for every single individual regardless of the religion or 
belief he possesses, regardless of his status and regardless of his 
condition in life. The desire to enjoy this right has already proved itself to 
be one of the most potent and contagious political forces that the world has 
ever known.2 
The need to find a means of accommodating religious diversity has played a 
significant role in the shaping of not only modern Europe, but of the international 
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legal system itself. 3  As Europe becomes increasingly religiously and culturally 
diverse, questions of identity, integration and accommodation of difference are at the 
forefront of political agendas.4 Despite a common European legal framework that 
protects the rights of individuals, there is little uniformity in the approaches of the 
member states in the European Union (EU) to these controversial issues. The issue 
of religious dress, specifically female Muslim religious dress, has been the subject of 
intense controversy within Europe over recent years.   
France and Turkey have imposed bans on religious clothing, including the headscarf.  
They are concerned with, among other reasons, that young women are being 
compelled to wear the veil or other religious symbols and they should not be 
subjected to such religious compulsion. The French Government believe that such 
ostentatious religious symbols undermine the French principles of democratic civil 
order and secularism. Similarly, the Turkish Government is concerned that such 
manifestations of Islam will make it more difficult to achieve the separation of religion 
and state which is the basis of the Turkish Constitution. 
The proponents and opponents of such bans have relied upon a diverse range of 
arguments for their positions and in doing so have frequently relied on the language 
of human rights. On the one hand, such laws and regulations have been justified on 
the grounds that they protect the dignity and equal rights of women, help preserve 
public security and reflect national values, such as official secularism. On the other 
hand, such laws have been attacked on the basis that they undermine women‟s 
rights to equal treatment, freedom of expression and religion and are counter-
productive to their purported aims of promoting integration.5 This article will establish 
a discussion surrounding the national approaches above,  as well as other European 
member States of the regulation of the Islamic headscarf (veil or hijab), within the 
education sector, and offer a critique of these approaches in relation to European 
Law and academic arguments. 
1 The Headscarf Debate: Relevant European Authority 
Although the EU pays incidental attention to issues related to religion, at the level of 
both its Commission and its Parliament, no centralized European policies related to 
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the issue exist. However, within the last 15 years or so, the question of religious 
dress codes has been increasingly framed in terms of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) in the EU and United Kingdom. 6  The relevant European 
provisions which protect the right to manifest a religious belief through clothing are 
taken from the ECHR are Article 9,7 Article 14,8 and Article 2 of the first protocol.9  
Article 9(1) states that „everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion... and freedom, either alone or in a community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance.‟   
In addition, Article 9(2) states that „[f]reedom to manifest one‟s religion or beliefs shall 
be subject only to such limitations as are proscribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others‟. This is 
further supported by Article 14, which states, „the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as ... religion‟. Finally, Article 2 of the first protocol sets out that „in the 
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, 
the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching to 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.‟ In this respect, at 
least on the wording of the ECHR, religious freedom is given very substantial 
protection.  
However, actions which amount to a manifestation protected by the relevant 
legislation above may be subject to limitations from two sources.  First, the ECHR 
permits States to derogate from their obligations under a number of Convention 
Articles, including Article 15, which allows this „in times of war or other public 
emergencies threatening the life of a nation‟, but only „to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation‟. However, no state has yet considered there to be 
a need to derogate, so it is unnecessary to do more than note this as just a 
theoretical possibility. As illustrated above, the second and most significant source of 
limitation is Article 9(2). In common with similar clauses in the Convention, it requires 
that limitations be both „proscribed by law‟ and „necessary in a democratic society‟, 
but with the State enjoying a certain margin of appreciation. This latter requirement 
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has been held by the Court to mean that any interference must, on the particular 
facts of the case before it, be proportionate to the aim pursued, be designed to meet 
a „pressing social need‟, and the reasons given for the interference by the State must 
be „relevant and sufficient‟. 10  It is at this point – when the Court assesses the 
proportionality of State interference with a right – that the „margin of appreciation‟ has 
assumed importance as a major adjudicative tool in certain types of case. 
2 Judicial Principles Relevant for Discussion 
The Margin of Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation is an international legal doctrine of judicial self-restraint or 
deference. The doctrine is entirely judge-made and it has no textual basis within the 
Convention itself. The Court‟s jurisdiction is of a supervisory nature and is subsidiary 
to the primary protection for rights provided by national authorities which are closer to 
the „vital forces of their countries‟.11 The doctrine‟s purpose, therefore, is to allow a 
degree of latitude to States as to how they protect the individual rights set out in the 
Convention. The margin has been held to be especially important in areas where 
there is said to be an absence of consensus or common practice across Europe, for 
example in the fields of morals and religion, and features prominently in the Court‟s 
case law.12 The width of the margin applied depends on various factors, including 
„the existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the 
Contracting States‟13 – whether there is clear European consensus on an „issue‟.  In 
Otto-Preminger-Institut the Court noted: 
It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society, even within a single country such conceptions 
may vary. For that reason it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive 
definition of what constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression where such expression is directed against the 
religious feelings of others. A certain margin of appreciation is therefore to be 
left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of the 
necessity of such interference. 
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However, Lewis14 argues that there is a fundamental problem with the granting of 
a margin of appreciation to States, on the basis of there being an absence of a 
pan-European consensus on religious issues. This argument tends to undercut 
the (albeit unsatisfactory) rationale for protecting the right to manifest religious 
belief in the first place. It is only because of diversity, and the pluralism that is so 
central to the whole scheme of the convention, that the right is necessary and 
important.15 Nowhere have the consequences of this been more evident than in 
several applications to the Court by Muslim women claiming their right to manifest 
their religious belief through dress. Some of the more important cases are 
discussed below. 
3 The Islamic Headscarf  Within Education  
In December 2006, the Report of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC) stated, „[t]he wearing of the headscarf is a complex and multi-
faceted issue that is often raised in public debate in most European countries during 
recent years, particularly in the area of education‟ 16  The varying approaches of 
member states to the protection of religious freedom is well demonstrated in the 
diverse range of positions adopted throughout Europe regarding the right to wear 
religious clothing or symbols in State schools, the most salient issue being the female 
Islamic dress. There are few countries in Europe whose courts have not yet had the 
occasion to rule on the presence of headscarves in educational institutions and the 
conclusions they have reached differ widely. Partly owing to their divergent 
interpretations of the „message‟ which the headscarf sends, partly because of 
differing views about the role and place of religious symbols in education and partly 
as a result of different conceptions and formulations of the „freedom of religion‟ in 
their national constitutions.   
Children, as autonomous individuals, enjoy the freedom of religion or belief in their 
own right, just as adults do. The right to education is guaranteed in several 
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international human rights instruments17 as an essential part of the contemporary 
human rights discourse, and considered as one of the „most complex human rights‟ 
in international law.18  One of the most important of these instruments is Article 14 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires the following: 
State parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion... Freedom to manifest over ones religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedom of others. 
The ban or limitation of any feature of the female Islamic dress in state schools raises 
the important issue of whether this interferes with a right to education. As already 
noted, the majority of high profile cases concerning the Islamic headscarf concern 
the education sector of Member States; therefore it will be useful to concentrate on 
this area of national and European case law and legislation.  France, Turkey and the 
UK will be dealt with in detail as their approaches are the most relevant for 
discussion.   
France 
On 17 March 2004, Law 2004-228 was published in the Official Journal of France to 
regulate, in educational establishments, the wearing of symbols that express 
religious adherence. The law prohibits symbols that „ostensibly‟ manifest a particular 
religious belief. 19  This was one recommendation of the report of the Stasi 
Commission (published in December 2003), after the question of headscarves in 
French public schools became a point of controversy for the third time in 15 years.  
The report described the difficulties of accommodating different races, cultures and 
religions while maintaining the principle of secularism. It acknowledged that it was 
necessary to find a balance between national unity and respect for diversity. 
Case law in France (beginning in 1989) has brought into focus a latent conflict 
between the individual expression of religious belief (through symbols) – which rests 
on the principles of freedom of expression and freedom of religion – and the 
collective value placed on the principle of laïcité, that is, the clear separation of 
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religion and the state.20 Laïcité is a principle protecting children from any form of 
religious proselytism or political indoctrination, overriding Human Rights and the 
freedom of religious expression, which was used as early as 1871 in the context of 
debates on the neutrality of public schools.21 It is also a principle that should remain 
indifferent towards ethnic, cultural and religious differences in the classroom.22 In 
French Parliamentary debates in 1994, the then Minister of Education, François 
Bayrou, said, „French national identity is inseparable from its schools‟.23  Bunting 
commented that school is considered to be the forum for the building of „an 
integrated, cohesive nation‟,24 while Anna Galeotti stated that „[t]he public school is... 
meant to produce French citizens and not the citizens of a multiethnic policy”.25 This 
is arguably quite a controversial viewpoint, but is fitting with the French principles of 
the separation of the Church and the state, as illustrated in the Law of Separation 
1905.26 
The 2004 law invoked enormous controversy when it was adopted, but it took until 
July 2009 for a series of direct challenges by pupils expelled from schools for 
wearing religious symbols to reach the EctHR; 27  however, they were declared 
inadmissible by the Court. In Dogru v France,28 the expulsion of a secondary school 
pupil who refused to remove her headscarf during her PE classes was found not to 
violate Article 9 of the ECHR. The Court found that the decision of the school 
authorities that wearing a headscarf was incompatible with sports classes for reasons 
of health or safety was not unreasonable, and exclusion was a justified and 
proportionate response. Applying its earlier jurisprudence, the Court found that „the 
State may limit the freedom to manifest a religion, for example by wearing an Islamic 
headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes with the aim of protecting the rights 
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and freedoms of others, public order and public safety‟.29 The Strasbourg Court paid 
particular attention (as had the French authorities and Courts) to the constitutional 
principle of secularism applicable in France. Protection of this principle, and to a 
lesser extent protection of health and safety, was a legitimate aim for restricting the 
right to manifest one‟s religion through the wearing of a religious symbol or clothing.   
Having regard to the margin of appreciation which must be left to the member 
States with regard to the establishment of the delicate relations between 
Churches and the State, religious freedom thus recognised and restricted by 
the requirements of secularism appears legitimate in the light of the values 
underpinning the convention.30 
Leigh argues that the court does not really explain why, given the background of 
secularism, a prohibition on restrictions of symbols is necessary – in effect, the 
question of proportionality is not really dealt with rigorously at all. 31 The United 
Nations Human Rights Commission‟s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion, 
Asma Jahangir, visited France in September 2005. He expressed concern at the 
indirect effects of the 2004 law and the manner of its application in particular cases: 
I am concerned that, in some circumstances, the selective interpretation and 
rigid application of the law has operated at the expense of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief...It is my impression that the direct, and indirect 
consequences of this law have not been properly considered...[T]he 
stigmatisation of the so called Islamic headscarf has triggered a wave of 
religious intolerance when women wear it outside school, at university or at 
their workplace.32 
In a relatively recent development (13 July 2010), the National Assembly voted to 
approve a ban on the wearing of voiles integrals – veils that cover the face, in public 
places, making France the first European country to do so.33 The Senate approved 
the legislation on 14 September in an almost unanimous vote. 34  The legislation 
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makes it illegal to wear garments such as the niqab or burqa anywhere in public. On 
7 October, France‟s Constitutional Court ruled that the ban on veils did not impinge 
upon civil liberties.35 However, the Court made a change to the law, in that it would 
not apply to public places of worship where it may violate religious freedom.36 The 
ban came into force on 11 April 2011; as such, it is too early to see the effect it will 
have on the French-Muslim population, and whether any legal ramifications will occur 
in relation to the ECHR.  
Turkey 
Turkey is one of the most fascinating case studies in the headscarf debate. Its 
population of around 70 million is overwhelmingly Muslim (some 99 per cent) but 
after its war of independence, the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 as a 
secular state. In 1937, a constitutional amendment was adopted according 
constitutional status to the principle of secularism, provided in Article 2 of the current 
Turkish Constitution of 1982. In the 1930s, the Islamic veil was banned which was: 
Inspired by the evolution of society in the nineteenth century and sought first 
and foremost to create a religion-free zone in which all citizens were 
guaranteed equality, without distinction on the grounds of religion or 
denomination.37 
The Dress (Regulations) Act of 3 December 1934 (Law No 2596) imposed a ban on 
wearing religious attire other than in places of worship or at religious ceremonies, 
irrespective of the religion or belief concerned. Turkey has had an increasingly 
divisive debate on wearing the headscarf to school and university since it emerged 
as a phenomenon in the 1980s. The first piece of legislation in institutions of higher 
education was a set of regulations issued by the Cabinet on 22 July 1981 prohibiting 
female members of staff and students from wearing veils in educational institutions. 
On 20 December 1982, the Higher-Education Authority issued a circular on the 
wearing of headscarves in institutions of higher education, declaring that the Islamic 
headscarf was banned in lecture theatres. In a judgment of 13 December 1984, the 
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Supreme Administrative Court held that the regulations were lawful, noting that 
beyond being a mere innocent practice, wearing the headscarf is in the process of 
becoming the symbol of a vision that is contrary to the freedoms of women and the 
fundamental principles of the Republic. The UN Special Rapporteur on the 
elimination of all forms of religious intolerance visited Turkey in 1999, and in 2000 
published a report that strongly questioned the Turkish Republics representation of 
itself as a secular state.38 The report additionally recommended that concerns over 
the political exploitation of religion should be reconciled and delineated by laws that 
allow for the free expression of dress within legitimate limitations. However, the 
report did not elaborate on the legitimate limits to free expression or dress.39 
T h e s e  v a r i o u s  r e f o r m s  r a i s e  c o n t e n t i o u s  
i s s u e s ,  w h i c h  p u t  I s l a m  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  s e c u l a r  g o v e r n m e n t .  However, on 9 February 2008, the 
Turkish government lifted the headscarf ban.  Restrictions do however remain for 
„more rigidly Islamic attire - veils that cover all of the hair and neck, the face, or 
cloaks that cover the body (such as the burqa) – in public offices‟, as the government 
only allows scarves tied under the chin, being traditionally Turkish and not Islamic.40 
Notwithstanding this reform, it is still necessary to discuss Karaduman v Turkey41 and 
Leyla Şahin v Turkey42 (which is the leading ECtHR precedent on the regulation of 
the headscarf). The applicant in Karaduman, a Muslim, had successfully completed 
her studies at Ankara University and had requested a degree certificate. She 
supplied a photograph of herself wearing an Islamic headscarf, but her certificate 
was withheld because she did not supply a photograph of herself bareheaded as 
required by University regulation.   
 
The applicant alleged that the refusal to provide a degree certificate was a violation 
of her right to freedom of religion (Article 9, ECHR) because covering her head with 
an Islamic headscarf was an observance and practice prescribed by her religion.  
She also alleged discrimination contrary to Article 14 ECHR on the basis that foreign 
female students attending Turkish Universities had total freedom to dress however 
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Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2012) 1 
 
106 
 
they wished. Turkey submitted, first, that the refusal did not interfere with her 
freedom of religion and secondly, that the obligation to respect the principle of 
secularity imposed on university students was a permissible restriction under Article 
9(2) ECHR. The Commission, when interpreting Article 9 in relation to Karaduman, 
expressed the view that by choosing to enter into higher education in a secular 
university: 
A student submits to those university rules, which may make the freedom of 
students to manifest their religion subject to restrictions as to place and 
manner, intended to ensure harmonious coexistence between students of 
different beliefs.43   
Therefore, there had been no violation of Article 9. With respect to the alleged 
discrimination contrary to Article 14 ECHR, the Commission found that part of the 
application inadmissible because the applicant had not raised the issue in domestic 
proceedings.44 It is important to note that while foreign female students at Turkish 
universities had freedom to dress as they wished, if they were Muslim, they could not 
wear the Islamic headscarf.45 
In Leyla Şahin the applicant came from a traditional family of practising Muslims and 
considered it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. She wore the 
headscarf during her four years of study at the University of Bursa, but in her fifth 
year she transferred to the University of Istanbul where she was denied access by 
invigilators into a written examination because she was wearing the headscarf. The 
applicant submitted that the Istanbul University circular regulating students‟ 
admission to the university campus – which prohibited the wearing of headscarves 
and resulted in her exclusion from Istanbul University – was a violation of her right of 
freedom to manifest her religion (Article 9). Şahin also alleged that a ban on wearing 
the headscarf violated her rights under Articles 8 (private life), 10 (expression) and 14 
(non-discrimination) of the Convention, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to 
education). 
The Grand Chamber (GC) of the ECtHR held that Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 
No. 1 were dispositive of the case and focused on those Articles in its opinions. The 
GC found that a ban on Islamic headscarves in a Turkish State university interfered 
with the Leyla Şahin’s right to manifest her religion under Article 9(1), but found the 
interference was justified under Article 9(2) of the ECHR. In justifying the ban on the 
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headscarf, the majority in that case relied exclusively on the reasons cited by the 
national authorities and Courts; they put forward, in general and abstract terms, two 
main arguments – secularism and equality. 46  The margin of appreciation is 
particularly appropriate when it comes to the regulation of the wearing of religious 
symbols in teaching institutions, since laws on the subject vary from one country to 
another. The Court‟s task was to determine whether the measures taken at national 
level were defensible. The GC held that the interference of Article 9(1) was justified in 
principle and proportionate to the aims pursued and could therefore be regarded as 
having been „necessary in a democratic society‟.47   
However, in her dissenting judgement, Judge Tulkens expressed dislike for the 
majority‟s wide margin of appreciation accorded to Contracting States in discharging 
their obligations under the Convention. Judge Tulkens doubted that a lack of 
consensus among European States should cause the Court to eschew its duty to 
supervise Contracting States efforts to conform to Convention standards. 48  The 
„protection of the rights of others‟, a legitimate aim in both Articles 9 and 10 of the 
ECHR, was one of the two interests Turkey argued it sought to promote by 
implementing the headscarf ban. Yet, it has been suggested that the European Court 
engaged in virtually no discussion of exactly what „rights and freedoms‟ Turkey 
sought to protect.49 It may be assumed „that the Court feared that headscarf-wearing 
students might pressure, render uncomfortable, or even coerce other students into 
wearing the headscarf – although no evidence that pressure or coercion actually 
existed among students was ever provided.‟50 Thus, according to its own standards 
on the right to freedom of expression, the Court should not have allowed Turkey to 
suppress the headscarf under Article 9 on this basis.51 
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With respect to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the GC 
observed that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one 
and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom to 
manifest one‟s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of various groups 
and ensure that everyone‟s beliefs are respected. 52  However, as Judge Tulkens 
suggests, „it is ironic that a young women should be deprived of that education on 
account of the headscarf‟.53 Yet, it is striking to note that the ECtHR avoided to make 
a specific „finding‟ that the restrictions on the Islamic headscarf on the facts in Şahin 
interfered with the applicant‟s right to manifest her religion. Instead, it preferred to 
proceed on the basis of the „assumption‟ that the regulations constituted interference.  
Therefore, no clear test was set out for later cases. This means that in the future 
there is a possibility that the Court may not accept that wearing a headscarf is a 
religious duty.54 As Carolyn Evans noted, the fact that the court was willing to state 
this explicitly in its judgment demonstrates its general reluctance to acknowledge the 
value and religious importance of many key religious practices outside of 
Christianity.55   
As aptly put by Cartner, the ECtHR has been a powerful force in extending basic 
freedoms in Turkey, but it missed an important opportunity in this case to stand firmly 
behind principles of freedom of religion, expression, and non-discrimination.56 On the 
basis of the foregoing case-law of the ECtHR, it may be stated that „the Court is 
trying, increasingly, to impose its own conception of secularism at an acknowledged 
cost to religious freedom‟, 57  as well as the right to education of female Muslim 
students who wish to wear the headscarf at universities in Turkey. It is interesting to 
speculate whether the Human Rights Committee (HRC) would find the Turkish 
prohibition to be a violation of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Boyle has argued that the HRC „would be likely to take a 
different view if it was possible to take a complaint to it‟.58  In support of this argument 
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he cited the HRC‟s decision in Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan,59 in which it was held 
that a ban on a headscarf in university violated Article 18(2) ICCPR. Turkey‟s secular 
approach has led to some interesting political challenges, and the restrictions on the 
headscarf have been a constant source of political tension since the 1980s.60 As 
shown in various examples above, Parliamentary legislation to lift restrictions has 
been passed but they have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Court. In spite of this, it will be interesting to see what effect the Turkish 
government‟s lifting of the headscarf ban will have on Muslim females and in 
particular, those in education. 
The United Kingdom 
The UK, unlike Turkey, portrays itself as a successful multicultural society that has 
positively embraced respect for cultural diversity through a policy of equal opportunity 
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and anti-racism.61 It is therefore necessary to 
discuss the UK‟s legal stance on the Islamic veil in some detail to distinguish the 
differences in relation to the more secular states, such as Turkey and France. In 
October 2006, the then leader of the House of Commons, Jack Straw, sparked 
controversy in the UK by commenting that he found speaking to a woman who is 
wearing a veil uncomfortable, describing the garment as „a visible sign of separation 
and of difference‟.62 The ensuing public debate was further fuelled by the news of an 
employment tribunal‟s finding of no religious discrimination in the case of a teaching 
assistant from West Yorkshire who had been suspended and subsequently 
dismissed from her job for wearing the veil, as this allegedly interfered with the 
quality of her teaching.63 A few months later, it was reported that schools in Britain 
would be „able to ban pupils from wearing the full-face veils on security, safety or 
learning grounds under new uniform guidance.64   
Unlike other European Countries, such as France, Britain had not experienced a 
widespread debate on veiling until 2006, which received international coverage.  
Nonetheless, what is intriguing and unique about British responses to Muslim 
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religious claims to wear the headscarf is the relative pluralism that exists in British 
institutions to accommodate the wearing of religious apparel,65 something which will 
be explored below. The British government established statutory protection against 
racial discrimination with the introduction of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 
1976). This Act made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of racial or ethnic status; 
however, it did not provide protection against religious discrimination. It can be 
observed that Jewish men‟s yarmulkes (skullcap) and Sikh men‟s dastar (turban) are 
not considered religious clothing, but are constituted as aspects of ethnic identity by 
the RRA 1976, and are consequently protected.   
Despite this exclusion, British Muslims‟ claims for statutory protection have been 
reinforced by the Runnymede Trust in 1997, which stated that Muslims in Britain 
experienced significant discrimination and resentment, and described this 
phenomenon as Islamophobia. This report recommended that the RRA 1976 be 
amended to make religious discrimination illegal. The UK has not laid down national 
rules on school uniforms but as a result of the „Straw veil debate‟, the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) issued guidance on school uniform policy, 
which it had not done previously. This guidance is underpinned by two 
considerations: first, school uniform policy should take serious consideration of its 
obligations under the HRA 1998 and anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, schools are 
obliged to ensure that their uniform policy does not interfere with the right to manifest 
a religion or belief and they „should act reasonably in accommodating religious 
requirements‟.66 
The second consideration concerned the limits on the exercise of religious liberties at 
school. This could be exercised if schools could demonstrate that it is justified on 
grounds specified in the HRA 1998.67 These include health, safety, and the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of other.68 On these grounds, the freedom to manifest a 
religion or belief does not imply that a person has the right to manifest their religion or 
belief at any time, in any place or in any particular manner. In relation to Islamic 
dress for girls in schools in the UK, this principle has been established in the case of 
R (Shabina Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School. 69  Shabina Begum, a 
Muslim female, was a pupil at Denbigh High school, Luton, and was almost 14 years 
                                                          
65
 Kilic, S., „The British Veil wars‟ (2008) Social Politics, para. 2. 
66
 DCSF Guidance School Uniform, October 2007: 
http://www.warrington.gov.uk/Images/School%20Uniform%20_2_tcm31-21445.pdf.   
67
 Human Rights Act 1998, Article 13, which encompasses Article 9 of the ECHR. 
68
 Kilic, „The British Veil Wars‟, para. 38. 
69
 [2006] UKHL 15. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2012) 1 
 
111 
 
old when the issue first arose. The school uniform for Muslim, Sikh and Hindu female 
pupils was the shalwar kameez (a loose fitting, long sleeve shirt and trousers) and, if 
they wished, a headscarf in school colours. Shabina happily wore her shalwar 
kameez from September 2000 (when she joined the school) to September 2002; 
however, in September 2002 Shabina and her brother informed the school that she 
wanted to wear the jilbab (a long cloak covering the whole body, except the hands 
and face).  Shabina did not want to compromise on this as she believed that only the 
jilbab complied with the strict requirements of Islam. The school refused to 
accommodate Shabina‟s request, and informed her that she could not return to 
school unless she wore the standard school uniform. The school maintained that it 
was not required to make any alteration to its uniform policy, or do any more than 
adopt a policy that was suitable for a secular school in England. 
Shabina then began judicial review proceedings against the school seeking a 
declaration that it had: (1) unlawfully excluded her contrary to ss. 64-68 of the School 
Standards and Framework Act 1998; (2) unlawfully denied her access to suitable and 
appropriate education in breach of Article 2 of the Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR; and 
(3) unlawfully denied her the right to manifest her religion in breach of Article 9(1) of 
the convention. The case reached the House of Lords, and their decision formed part 
of the wider debate surrounding whether religious clothing should be accommodated 
in state schools and the place of Islam in western democracy. Within the context of 
the current social climate, the war on terror, the need to curb radical Islam, and 
allegations of Islamophobia, the House of Lords were fully aware they had a difficult 
task ahead of them.70 
Their Lordships unanimously held that Shabina‟s right to religious freedom had not 
been violated under Article 9(1) of the Convention because she freely chose the 
school with knowledge of the uniform policy and because she was free to attend 
alternative institutions, which allowed the shalwar kameez. The main question for 
their Lordships were whether Shabina‟s freedom to manifest her belief was subject to 
interference within the meaning of Article 9(2) and, if so, whether such interference 
was justified.71 It was pointed out in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education 
and Employment 72  that what „constitutes interference depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, including the extent to which, in the circumstances, an 
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individual can reasonably expect to be at liberty to manifest his beliefs in practice‟.  
Of relevance was the following declaration by the European Court in Kalac v 
Turkey:73 
Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religious belief. 
Moreover, in exercising his freedom to manifest his religion, an individual may 
need to take his specific situation into account.74 
When considering the interference of the Article 9 right, the House of Lords took into 
consideration the lengths made by Denbigh High School and its governors to create 
an acceptable and cohesive uniform policy.75 Lord Hoffman concurred, opining that 
Shabina‟s right was not infringed because there was nothing to stop her from going 
to a local school whose rules permitted the jilbab. Arrangements could have been 
made to transfer Shabina to one of these schools but she did not take up the chance 
of doing so,76 therefore her right to education under Article 2 of the First Protocol had 
not been interfered with. However, one of the chief criticisms of the House of Lord‟s 
decision is that it clearly favours a non-individualised view of religious dress and that 
school authorities can now select between religious beliefs – for example, adopt the 
views considered acceptable by mainstream Muslim opinion, but ignore the views of 
stricter Muslims.77 
When considering the proportionality of Denbigh High‟s interference with Shabina‟s 
right to manifest her religious belief, the House drew valuable guidance from the 
European Court‟s decision in Şahin, 78  where the Court recognised the high 
importance of the rights protected by Article 9, but also the need in some situations to 
restrict the freedom to manifest religious belief. This ruling effectively maintains the 
current right of each school to decide its policy on school uniforms. Denbigh High 
School did not reject Shabina‟s request to wear the jilbab out of hand, rather, it took 
advice, and was told that its existing policy conformed to the requirements of 
mainstream Muslim opinion.79 However, it must be noted that at the outset of the 
case, Lord Bingham stated: 
This case concerns a particular pupil and a particular school in a particular 
place and at a particular time. It must be resolved on facts which are now, for 
purposes of the appeal, agreed. The House is not, and could not be, invited to 
                                                          
73
 (1997) 27 EHRR 552. 
74
 Ibid., para. 27. 
75
 For example, in 1993, the school appointed a working party to re-examine its dress code in 
response to requests by several Muslim girls. 
76
 Kalac, para. 89. 
77
 Idriss, „Dress Codes‟, p.67. 
78
 Leyla Şahin, paras. 104-111. 
79
 Ibid., para. 33, per Lord Bingham. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2012) 1 
 
113 
 
rule whether Islamic dress, or any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not 
be permitted in the schools of this country. That would be a most inappropriate 
question for the House in its judicial capacity.80 
This statement would suggest that when public institutions take decisions in a 
thoughtful, sensitive and participatory manner that seek to balance the relevant 
considerations, their decisions will not be interfered with lightly by the courts on 
human rights grounds.81 
The UK immigration minister, Damian Green, has said that trying to pass a law 
banning women wearing the Islamic veil would be „un-British‟ and at odds with the 
UK‟s tolerant and mutually respectful society.82 However, it is interesting to note that 
British MP Philip Hollobone introduced a Private Members‟ Bill entitled the „Face 
Coverings Regulations Bill‟, which would make it illegal for people to cover their faces 
in public.83 The same Parliamentarian has also indicated that he would refuse to 
meet constituents wearing the veil. This has reignited a national debate on banning 
the wearing of veils in the UK, even though there is less popular support for such a 
ban in the country than in other European states.84 The bill received its second 
reading in the House of Commons on 3 December 2010.  
Conclusion 
In this highly contentious debate, some member states have adopted an 
assimilationist approach to religious and cultural diversity, in that they require 
conformity to a set of rules (such as France and Turkey), while others have taken 
steps of varying degrees towards accommodation of difference (for example, the 
UK).  However, from the case law discussed above, it can be argued that these 
European States predominantly have a negative approach to the regulation of the 
Islamic headscarf (hijab), and especially of the full face veil (burqa).                                                                                                                                                            
The leading study of the views of young French Muslim women by Gaspard and 
Khosrokhavar found that they perceived the headscarf-hijab as an autonomous 
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expression of their identity and not as a form of domination. As McGoldrick  explains, 
for some women the headscarf is a sign of deep personal and religious conviction 
and it signifies purity and their good status as a Muslim. It preserves their modesty 
and inconspicuous nature and is thus a central part of their personal identity and 
autonomy. It also serves as a protection from sexual harassment and interaction with 
men. The wearing of the headscarf is sometimes regarded as a statement of 
opposition to western and secular society. This is particularly illustrated in the 
depiction of women as sexual objects. However, western states and courts do not 
seem to have a detailed understanding of why a woman would wear the headscarf.  
From analysing the reasoning behind the ECtHR‟s decisions illustrated above, there 
does not seem to be any examples of the courts actively trying to understand their 
motives. 
It can be argued that women wearing the Islamic headscarf could be protected under 
other international laws. The Human Rights Committee indicated that rules on 
clothing could potentially violate human rights guaranteed in General Comment No. 
28 (2000) on the equality of rights between men and women:85 
The Committee stresses that such regulations [on clothing to be worn by 
women in public] may involve a violation of a number of rights guaranteed by 
the Covenant, such as: article 26, on non-discrimination; article 7, if corporal 
punishment is imposed in order to enforce such a regulation; article 9, when 
failure to comply with the regulation is punished by arrest; article 12, if liberty of 
movement is subject to such a constraint; article 17, which guarantees all 
persons the right to privacy without arbitrary or unlawful interference; articles 
18 and 19, when women are subjected to clothing requirements that are not in 
keeping with their religion or their right of self-expression; and, lastly, article 27, 
when the clothing requirements conflict with the culture to which the woman 
can lay a claim. 
As well as this, as mentioned above, it would be intriguing to observe if any of the 
applicants would be successful with their claims if they had argued a breach of at 
least one of the criteria in Article 18(2) of the ICCPR. In the case of Hudoyberganova 
v Uzbekistan, the Human Rights Committee considered the case of an author who 
refused to remove her headscarf at a university in the face of a ban. The Committee 
expressly stated that „the freedom to manifest one‟s religion encompasses the right 
to wear clothes or attire in public which is in conformity with the individual‟s faith or 
religion‟, and that „to prevent a person from wearing religious clothing in public or 
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private may constitute a violation of Article 18, paragraph 2, which prohibits any 
coercion that would impair the individual‟s freedom to have or adopt a religion‟.86 
 
It has been suggested that the headscarf has a negative effect on the integration of 
minority religions into a society. In a recent resolution and recommendation, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) recognised that religious 
traditions of full-veiling, which may leave women feeling that they ought to wear the 
full-veil, are not compatible with the equality and dignity of women. In line with this 
resolution, PACE Recommendation 1927 (2010) on Islam, Islamism and 
Islamophobia in Europe asks the Committee of Ministers to:  
Call on member states not to establish a general ban of the full veiling or other 
religious or special clothing, but to protect women from all physical and 
psychological duress as well as their free choice to wear religious or special 
clothing and to ensure equal opportunities for Muslim women to participate in 
public life and pursue education and professional activities; legal restrictions on 
this freedom may be justified where necessary in a democratic society, in 
particular for security purposes or where public or professional functions of 
individuals require their religious neutrality or that their face can be seen.87 
These recommendations recognise that there is a „huge gulf of toleration between 
respect and banning‟; although full face veils should not be banned, that does not 
mean that they are a good thing or should be supported. 88  The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe have suggested that general prohibitions on 
wearing the burqa and the niqab – such as those adopted or proposed across a 
number of states, notably France – are incompatible with states‟ human rights 
obligations in relation to freedom of expression and also freedom of religion and the 
right to equal treatment and non-discrimination.89 Therefore, it will be very interesting 
to see whether future claims on this basis are successful from applicants from the 
noted countries. 
It would seem appropriate that States considering adopting restrictions on full face 
veils should ensure that they are provided by law, are based on a specific legitimate 
aim (such as the protection of national security) and are necessary and proportionate 
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to achieve that aim. Furthermore, restrictions should not be discriminatory in their 
purposes or their implementation. As shown by the decision in Şahin, the Court found 
in favour of Turkey by not allowing the headscarf in universities; however, France‟s 
recent decision to ban the full face veil in public may raise some human rights 
debates under Article 9 of the ECHR.   
A uniform solution throughout Europe might neither be achievable nor desirable.  
Each Member State has an individual approach to regulating religious manifestation 
in public, and a „blanket law‟ would be very difficult to implement. What is arising from 
the current case law of the ECtHR, however, is a significant tension between the 
principles put forward and the way they are applied.90 So far, referring to the national 
margin of appreciation is the only explanation the ECtHR has been offering when the 
issue of banning the headscarf is at stake. However, because of the power afforded 
to the Member States it is important that they do not abuse the position given to 
them. Nonetheless, it can be argued that secular states such as France and Turkey 
have, by banning the headscarf or veil, infringed upon the individual‟s basic right to 
manifest their religious belief. 
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